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Forget the Whales: Expanding the Twilight and 
Diminishing the Nadir of Youngstown
I. INTRODUCTION
Moments into then-Judge Samuel Alito’s 2006 confirmation 
hearings, members of the Senate Judiciary Committee promptly directed 
their discussion toward the limits of presidential powers.1 Very recently, 
it had been discovered that the executive administration had conducted 
warrantless electronic surveillance of American citizens, “intentionally 
bypassing the secret federal court that is supposed to oversee [such] 
sensitive investigations.”2 Referring to the surveillance program as an 
exposed abuse of executive power, Republican Senator Arlen Spector 
remarked that such a system put the vital “equilibrium established by our 
constitutional system” at stake.3 Of course, this dialogue inevitably led to 
a discussion of Justice Jackson’s famous concurrence in Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer,4 very often recognized as the system used to 
delimit presidential power. Taking a cue from his future chief justice, 
who more than three months earlier in his own confirmation hearings 
endorsed Jackson’s concurrence by stating that it “set the framework for 
consideration of questions of executive power in times of war and with 
respect to foreign affairs,”5 Justice Alito signaled his understanding of 
the matter by stating that “no person in this country, no matter how high 
or powerful, is above the law.”6
However, only two years after making those statements, both 
Justices found themselves in a majority which would rewrite the 
boundaries set in Youngstown when the Executive was faced by one of 
its most unlikely opponents to date—the beaked whale. In Winter v. 
1. ADAM LIPTAK, A QUICK FOCUS ON THE POWERS OF A PRESIDENT, N.Y. Times, JAN. 10,
2006, AT A1. 
2. Josh Meyer, Leak in Domestic Spy Program Investigated, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2005, at 
A1. This “secret” federal court is the FISA Court, established by the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act in 1978, which is comprised of eleven district court judges that “have jurisdiction 
to hear applications for and grant orders approving electronic surveillance anywhere within the 
United States.” 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(1) (2006). 
3. Liptak, supra note 1, at A1. 
4. 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
5. Liptak, supra note 1, at 16 (quoting Chief Justice John G. Roberts during his 
confirmation hearing). 
6. Liptak, supra note 1, at 16. 
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Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,7 the Executive (in the 
incarnation of the United States Navy) is pitted against Congress’s 
champion, a few hundred Pacific cetaceans protected from potentially 
harmful government practices through a Congressional statute.8 At the 
end of the bout, the Executive was the branch left standing, and the 
results of this confrontation may have caused serious changes to the 
constitutional balance of power. First, the Supreme Court opened a new 
avenue of presidential power by allowing the Executive to seek the 
protection of independent emergency powers even if such an emergency 
is caused by the Executive’s own neglect or disregard for the law. 
Second, the Supreme Court significantly lowered the threshold which 
triggers emergency executive powers by deferring to the Executive for 
determinations of necessity. Although the parameters of presidential 
power had been previously set in place, Winter effectively expanded 
those powers, both broadening Youngstown’s zone of twilight, and 
diminishing its nadir.9
This Note will analyze and explore Winter and its implications by 
first setting the stage with a brief explanation of executive emergency 
and commander-in-chief powers, including their relation to the 
Youngstown taxonomy. Then, this Note will frame the issue by providing 
a factual background to Winter and the disputed statute. Finally, this 
Note will explain the holding of Winter and how it introduced an 
expansion of executive power. 
II. LIMITS TO PRESIDENTIAL POWER
Article II of the Constitution vests “The executive Power” in the 
President of the United States10 and makes him, or her, the “Commander 
in Chief of the Army and Navy.”11 This investiture grants powers that are 
both vast and fluid to a single branch of the government. The vastness of 
these powers confers a broad reach upon the Executive, allowing it to act 
in the best interests of the people in areas where the Constitution has 
7. 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008). 
8. In this case, the Navy sought to use mid-frequency active (“MFA”) sonar during 
submarine-warfare training exercises. The use of this sonar arguably causes serious injuries to 
whales and other marine mammals, “including permanent hearing loss, decompression sickness, and 
major behavioral disruptions.” Id. at 371. The respondents filed their petition for an injunction with 
the hopes of providing protection for the beaked whales in that region by requiring the government 
to fulfill certain statutory requirements that they had overlooked. Id. at 371–73. These statutory 
requirements, including the mandatory filing of an Environmental Impact Statement, are detailed 
infra Part III. 
9. See infra notes 19–25 and accompanying text (providing a description of what is meant 
by the “twilight” and “nadir” of executive powers).
10. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (emphasis added). 
11. Id. § 2, cl. 1. 
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barred its co-equal branches from operating. The fluidity of these powers 
makes them adaptable to situations as they arise, inherently endowing the 
Executive with the authority to create adequate and immediate remedies 
for emergency situations. Nevertheless, this authority to act swiftly and 
decisively does have boundaries. This section will sketch the blurry 
limits of those boundaries as they existed before Winter by briefly 
defining the inner limits of those powers as they are found in Justice 
Jackson’s tripartite classification. This section will subsequently delve 
into the outer reaches of executive power by specifically examining the 
broad commander-in-chief powers, especially in dealing with 
emergencies, before moving on to consider the case at issue. 
A.  Youngstown Limitations 
In 1951, a war had been raging on the Korean Peninsula for more 
than eighteen months12 when “a dispute arose between the steel 
companies and their employees over [the] terms and conditions that 
should be included in new collective bargaining agreements.”13 After 
multiple failed attempts to come to an agreement, the steelworkers 
threatened a nation-wide strike.14
President Truman recognized the Korean Crisis as an emergency and 
deemed that a “work stoppage would immediately jeopardize and imperil 
our national defense and the defense of those joined with us in resisting 
aggression, [adding] to the continuing danger of our soldiers, sailors, and 
airmen engaged in combat in the field.”15 Under these circumstances, and 
citing his powers as Commander-in-Chief as authorization to take drastic 
measures for the protection of the Union,16 the President issued an 
executive order directing the Secretary of Commerce to take possession 
of most of the Nation’s steel mills in order to keep them running.17
Although the majority opinion of the Court, penned by Justice Black, 
would clearly set a precedent in denying President Truman such an 
interpretation of executive powers, it is Justice Jackson’s concurrence 
that lives on by effectively delineating a three-category system for 
measuring the constitutionality of executive action.18 In the first category 
12. See BURTON IRA KAUFMAN, THE KOREAN CONFLICT 3 (1999). 
13. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582 (1952). 
14. Id. at 582–83.
15. Exec. Order No. 10,340, 3 C.F.R. 65–66 (1953). 
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635–39 (Jackson, J., concurring). See, e.g., Tara L. Branum, 
President or King? The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders in Modern-Day America, 28 J. LEGIS. 1,
62 (2002) (“Despite the numerous opinions issued in Youngstown upholding the importance of a 
system of checks and balances, Justice Jackson’s concurrence may have been the most important, as 
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of Jackson’s classification, the “zenith” of executive power, a President 
acts “pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress.”19
Accordingly, the Executive’s powers are at their maximum because the 
inherent powers granted to the Executive by the Constitution are fully 
supplemented by the approbation of Congress and the strength of his 
own Article I powers.20 In the second or intermediate category, known as 
the “zone of twilight,” the President “and Congress may have concurrent 
authority,” or, to put it more simply, “[the authority’s] distribution is 
uncertain.”21 Here, Justice Jackson admits, is a place where the extent of 
either branch’s constitutional authority truly depends on the 
circumstances and not on any “abstract theories of law.”22 The third and 
final category of Justice Jackson’s taxonomy, which may be termed as 
the nadir of presidential authority, occurs when “the President takes 
measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of 
Congress.”23 In this category, the President may only rely “upon his own 
constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over 
the matter.”24
After Youngstown, the Supreme Court found that Justice Jackson’s 
dicta provided a functional scale for its own analysis25 and officially 
followed it.26 Since that decision, Jackson’s approach has been employed 
in multiple opinions.27 However, its interpretation has begun to evolve in 
order to fill analytical gaps.28 In Winter, although it is certainly clear that 
Youngstown stood for the idea that the Executive may not independently 
it is perhaps the most thorough judicial evaluation of the use of presidential directives, and it is often 
relied upon.” (citation omitted)).
19. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
20. Id. at 635–36.




25. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 669 (1981) (stating that the court has found 
Justice Jackson’s analysis to be “analytically useful”).
26. Id. at 661 (“Justice Jackson, . . . in his concurring opinion in Youngstown, . . . brings 
together as much combination of analysis and common sense as there is in this area . . . .”); see also
Thomas A. O’Donnell, Note, Illumination or Elimination of the “Zone of Twilight”? Congressional 
Acquiescence and Presidential Authority in Foreign Affairs, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 95, 99 (1982) 
(stating that the Supreme Court had ignored Justice Jackson’s classifications until Dames & Moore); 
Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408, 441 n.165 (2007) 
(“A majority of the Court adopted Justice Jackson’s approach in Dames & Moore v. Regan . . . .”). 
27. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 962 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring); Morrison v. 
Olsen, 487 U.S. 654, 694 (1988); Misretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 381 (1989); Clinton v. 
New York, 524 U.S. 417, 473 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
28. Michael J. Turner, Comment, Fade to Black: The Formalization of Jackson’s 
Youngstown Taxonomy by Hamdan and Medillin, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 665, 690 (2009) (arguing that 
post-Hamdan and Medillin, Justice Jackson’s concurrence has come to resemble much more the 
majority opinion of Justice Black). 
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legislate and invade the jurisdiction of Congress,29 the Supreme Court 
gave Justice Jackson’s analysis an evolutionary shove as it attempted to 
remedy the fact that it “did not contemplate calling for an examination of 
implied presidential authority under the imminent danger doctrine.”30
B.  The Commander-in-Chief 
Following the chaotic years under the Articles of Confederation and 
during the drafting process, the Framers acknowledged the need for a 
strong executive who could act decisively in times of emergency.31
History had already proven to them that a powerful executive in 
troubling times was an absolute requirement for effective government. 
As students of the Classics, they recognized that Rome was effectively 
able to fight off the “assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy” by 
taking “refuge in the absolute power of a single man.”32 They understood 
that: 
Among all the other Roman institutions, [the dictatorship] truly 
deserves to be considered and numbered among those which were the 
source of the greatness of such an empire, because without a similar 
system cities survive . . . only with difficulty. . . . When a republic lacks 
such a procedure, it must necessarily come to ruin by obeying its laws or 
break them in order to avoid its own ruin.33
Consequently, “the language of the Constitution makes the President 
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and puts no limitation on his 
power in this capacity.”34 Although Congress maintains the power “to 
declare war,”35 “to raise and support armies,”36 “to provide for and 
maintain a Navy,”37 and to make rules for the “Government and 
Regulation of land and naval Forces,”38 the Executive, as President, 
maintains sole command of the military.39
29. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 588–89.
30. Saby Ghoshray, False Consciousness and Presidential War Power: Examining the 
Shadowy Bends of Constitutional Curvature, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 165, 184 (2009). 
31. THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 407 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898) (“Of all the 
cares or concerns of government, the direction of war most peculiarly demands those qualities which 
distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand.”).
32. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 384 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898). 
33. NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, DISCOURSES ON LIVY 95 (Julia Conaway Bondanella & Peter 
Bondanella trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2003) (1531). 
34. United States v. Smith, 32 C.M.R. 105, 117 (C.M.A. 1962). 
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
36. Id. at cl. 12. 
37. Id. at cl. 13. 
38. Id. at cl. 14. 
39. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 644 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“Congress cannot deprive the 
President of the command of the army and navy.”).
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These broad powers supposedly grant the President supreme 
authority over all matters concerning the defense of the United States.40
Logically, since the defense of a nation consists of more than retaliation 
in the face of an attack, this would infer that the President also maintains 
that same supremacy in times of peace in preparing the armed forces for 
the defense of the nation.41 Indeed, before the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor and the subsequent entrance of the United States into World War 
II, Attorney General Robert H. Jackson declared that the President “may 
order the carrying out of maneuvers or training, or the preparation of 
fortifications, or the instruction of others in matters of defense, to 
accomplish the same objective of safety of the country.”42 As maintained 
by Attorney General Jackson, the powers of the Commander-in-Chief 
“exist in time of peace as well as in time of war.”43
However, constitutional powers contestably grant the Executive 
broad authority to act unilaterally in times of emergency, sometimes 
even bending the boundaries set by the Constitution.44 Arguably, many 
of the Framers expected there to be moments where the Executive would 
need to act out of necessity, for the preservation of the Union, and 
implicitly left this license to the President’s branch.45
This concept of unhindered executive action in times of emergency 
has been ratified through both presidential practice and Supreme Court 
jurisprudence. During one of America’s darkest hours, President 
Abraham Lincoln took some constitutionally questionable measures in 
order to preserve the Union.46 Understanding the responsibility of his 
office and the weight of self-preservation, Lincoln explained that he 
made those extra-constitutional decisions because he “felt that measures, 
otherwise unconstitutional, might become lawful, by becoming 
40. See William Howard Taft, The Boundaries Between the Executive, the Legislative and the 
Judicial Branches of the Government, 25 YALE L.J. 599, 610 (1916) (“When we come to the power 
of the President as Commander-in-Chief it seems perfectly clear that Congress could not order 
battles to be fought on a certain plan, and could not direct parts of the army to be moved from one 
part of the country to another.”).
41. WESTEL WOODBURY WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
1566 (2d ed. 1929) (“Through, or under, his orders, therefore, all military operations in times of 
peace, as well as of war, are conducted. He has within his control the disposition of troops, the 
direction of vessels of war and the planning and execution of campaigns.”).
42. Training of British Flying Students in the United States, 40 Op. Att’y Gen. 58, 62 (1941).
43. Id. at 61. 
44. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934) (“While emergency 
does not create power, emergency may furnish the occasion for the exercise of power.”).
45. THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, at 225 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898) (“It is in vain to 
oppose constitutional barriers to the impulse of self-preservation. It is worse than in vain; because it 
plants in the Constitution itself necessary usurpations of power, every precedent of which is a germ 
of unnecessary and multiplied repetitions.”).
46. President Lincoln argued that under the “Take Care Clause,” he had the authority to 
suspend certain constitutional rights in order to preserve the Union. Michael P. Kelly, Fixing the 
War Powers, 141 MIL. L. REV. 83, 112 n.135 (1993). 
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indispensible to the preservation of the constitution, through the 
preservation of the nation.”47 More recently, the administration of 
President George W. Bush also maintained its ability to play the 
emergency card, even in spite of Congressional restraints, “when[ever] 
there is a ‘belief that an attack might be imminent.’”48
The Supreme Court has been less explicit concerning this position; 
nevertheless, it has remained clearly supportive. Clearly recognizing the 
requirement of decisive action in times of immediate necessity, 
especially during an impending invasion, the Court has declared that the 
Executive “is not only authorized but bound to resist by force . . . without 
waiting for any special legislative authority.”49 Even when employing 
Justice Jackson’s Youngstown dicta, then-Justice Rehnquist recognized 
that the tripartite taxonomy could be an oversimplification of matters, 
meaning that simply because the President acts contrary to congressional 
mandate does not necessarily mean that his actions are unconstitutional. 50
This is especially true in cases “involving responses to international 
crises the nature of which Congress can hardly have been expected to 
anticipate in any detail.”51 Common sense simply cannot require a 
doctrinaire interpretation of the Constitution when such would transform 
it into a “suicide pact.”52
In spite of a common-sense need for flexibility to the Constitution, 
common sense also requires that that such flexibility not extend to the 
point of abuse. Therefore, it would appear that executive emergency 
powers fit into Justice Jackson’s nadir, being an inherent power that is 
available in spite of congressional disapproval, yet confined to the rarest 
of circumstances. Unfortunately, as demonstrated below, Winter
broadens those circumstances, effectively diminishing the nadir and 
expanding the twilight of Jackson’s taxonomy.
47. Letter from President Abraham Lincoln to Sen. Albert Hodges (Apr. 4, 1864), in 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859–1865, at 585 (1989). Interestingly, former 
Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, whom many consider a modern executive who abused his 
powers in office, cited Abraham Lincoln’s “suspension of some rights during the American Civil 
War as justification for his own state of emergency” in 2007. David Rohde, Pakistani Sets 
Emergency Rule, Defying the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2007, at A14. 
48. Alan Clarke, Creating a Torture Culture, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 1, 3–
4 (2008) (citing Greg Miller, Waterboarding is Still an Option; The White House Calls the 
Technique Legal, Stunning Critiques, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2008, at A1) (explaining that the President 
reserves the right to use harsh interrogation techniques, contrary to any Congressional mandate, 
when he or she feels that the use of such techniques would be in the best interest of the nation). 
49. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1862). 
50. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 669 (1981). 
51. Id.
52. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). See also
RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL 
EMERGENCY 1–15 (2006). 
156 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 24
III. WHALES SHMALES, THERE’S A NATION TO DEFEND! 
Understanding this new change in the constitutional balance of 
powers will best be done by first obtaining some background to Winter
through examining the statute at issue and then moving on to describe the 
case and its holding. Therefore, this section will begin by explaining the 
history and purpose of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 
through an examination of its language and legislative history. Then the 
section will dive directly into Winter to explain the Supreme Court’s 
holding, as well as its reasoning, and the following section will address 
the implications of its holding. 
A.  The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 
In 1969, after taking note of “[t]he public’s growing concern . . . seen 
in the form of citizen indignation and protest over the actions or, in some 
cases, the lack of action of Federal agencies . . . [that] have contributed to 
environmental decay and degradation,”53 Congress recognized that when 
it had established some federal policies, it had “no body of experience or 
precedent for . . . consideration of environmental factors . . . .”54 Until 
that point, environmental policy had essentially been “established by 
default and inaction.”55 Therefore, desiring to “restore public confidence 
in the Federal Government’s capacity to . . . maintain and enhance the 
quality of the environment,”56 Congress passed the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Henceforth, it would be “the 
continuing policy of the Federal Government . . . to use all practicable 
means and measures . . . to create and maintain conditions under which 
man and nature can exist in productive harmony.”57
To accomplish this objective, the Act requires that, among other 
things, federal agencies prepare and file an Environmental Impact 
Statement (“EIS”) for any “major Federal action[] significantly affecting 
53. S. REP. NO. 91-296, at 8 (1969). The Senate Report specifically cites the Santa Barbara 
oil spill of 1969 as an example of government negligence. Id. The spill occurred as a result of human 
error as well as the fact that the drilling company had been “granted a waiver by the United States 
Geological Survey that allowed [it] to use a shorter casing on the [drilling] pipe than Federal 
Standards prescribed.” Keith C. Clarke & Jeffrey J. Hemphill, The Santa Barbara Oil Spill: A 
Retrospective, 64 YEARBOOK OF THE ASS’N OF PACIFIC COAST GEOGRAPHERS 157, 158 (2002), 
available at http://www.geog.ucsb.edu/~kclarke/Papers/SBOilSpill1969.pdf. The casing was 
supposed to reinforce the pipe in order to prevent blow-outs. Id. The oil spill led to significant 
community and government action. See S. REP. NO. 91–296 at 8. 
54. S. REP. NO. 91-296 at 19. 
55. Id. at 5. 
56. Id. at 8. 
57. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (2006). 
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the quality of the human environment.”58 These reports should detail any 
adverse effects, both temporary and permanent, that a proposed federal 
action would create as well as propose more environmentally friendly 
alternatives to that action.59 Because some “actions—often actions 
having irreversible consequences—are undertaken without adequate 
consideration of, or knowledge about, their impact on the 
environment,”60 this new federal requirement was supposed to ensure 
that “the environmental impact of [any] proposed action [had] been 
studied and that the results of the studies [had] been given 
consideration”61 before any final decision is taken.62
It is important to note that the Act does not proscribe any federal 
activities that could be harmful to the environment. In fact, it merely 
requires that details about “any adverse environmental effects which 
cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented,”63 be included in 
the EIS. Congress clearly understood that some actions, in the interest of 
the people, would have to be taken—regardless of their impact on the 
environment.64 Indeed, it should therefore be clear that the intended 
purpose of the required EIS is to “serve practically as an important 
contribution to the decision-making process,”65 not as an ultimate 
impediment to the execution of federal actions. 
B.  Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council 
However, the Navy failed to comply with NEPA when it was to 
commence training exercises in March 2007 off the coast of California, 
so the EIS became a barrier. Anxious to begin its training and not 
wanting to wait for the completion of an EIS, the Navy determined that, 
based on data already collected concerning the environmental effect of 
its exercises,66 it could proceed with its training without filing an EIS.67
58. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). 
59. Id.
60. S. REP. NO. 91-296 at 9. 
61. Id. at 20. 
62. Justice Ginsburg made certain to point out the fact that the EIS is supposed to be 
completed and filed before any other action has taken place so that it might serve its important 
advisory role. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 390 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
63. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(ii) (2006). 
64. S. REP. NO. 91-296 at 20 (implying that some actions will be taken in spite of their 
environmental impact by declaring that an “action leading to . . . adverse environmental effects 
[must be] justified by other considerations of national policy and those other considerations must be 
stated in the finding”).
65. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.5 (2009) (“The statement shall be prepared early enough so that it can 
serve practically as an important contribution to the decisionmaking process and will not be used to 
rationalize or justify decisions already made.”).
66. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 372. 
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Nonetheless, when the Navy’s actions were challenged, a United States 
District Court held that the Navy’s findings were inadequate and that its 
actions violated NEPA.68 The court enjoined the Navy from continuing 
its exercises without filing an EIS unless it significantly adjusted those 
exercises to mitigate their impact if they were to continue without filing 
an EIS.69 The Navy sought relief from the Executive, which granted it, 
finding that the continuation of the Navy’s training exercises was a 
necessity and believing that the mitigating actions were too restrictive to 
fully simulate real combat situations.70
Immediately, the Executive, in the form of the President, declared 
“that continuation of the exercises . . . was ‘essential to national 
security.’”71 The Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”), an office 
within the Executive,72 determined that the District Court’s injunction 
created an emergency, interpreting the President’s declaration to mean 
that the strictures on training would “undermine the Navy’s ability . . . to 
ensure the combat effectiveness of . . . strike groups.”73 The CEQ, 
through the power of the Executive, authorized the Navy to implement 
practice arrangements alternative to those mandated by the judiciary so 
that it could continue its training exercises in spite of the judgment.74
Although the Navy never conceded that it had a responsibility to file 
an EIS under NEPA,75 its key argument was no longer focused on the 
statute when the case reached the Supreme Court. In oral argument, the 
Navy claimed that, in light of the emergency circumstances created by 
the district court’s injunction, the Executive Branch’s authorization 
67. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Winter, No. 8:07-cv-00225-FMC-FMOX, 2007 WL 
2481037 at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2007); Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 372. Instead of filing an EIS, the Navy 
filed an Environmental Assessment. Id. This is a “concise public document” which is supposed to 
“[b]riefly provide sufficient evidence for determining whether to prepare an environmental impact 
statement or a finding of no significant impact.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(a) (2009). If a federal agency, 
when filing an Environmental Assessment, finds that there should be no significant environmental 
impact caused by any proposed federal action, an EIS is not required. See Id. § 1508.13 (2009). 
However, as was noted by Justice Ginsburg, “by definition, an [Environmental Assessment] alone 
does not satisfy an agency’s obligation under NEPA if the effects of a proposed action require 
preparation of a full EIS.” Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 388 n.1 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
68. Winter, 2007 WL 2481037 at *6, *11. 
69. See id.  at *11. 
70. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 373. 
71. Id. at 373, 378 (citation omitted). 
72. 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (“There is created in the Executive Office of the President a Council on 
Environmental Quality . . . [which shall be] composed of three members who shall be appointed by 
the President to serve at his pleasure, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.”).
73. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 373 (quotation marks omitted) (citing the petitioner’s brief).
74. Id. at 373–74.
75. Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, Winter, 129 S. Ct. 365 (No. 07-1239) (“The Navy has 
never conceded that it was required to do an EIS at the outset. It simply has agreed to live with the 
alternative arrangements approved by the Council on Environmental Quality.”).
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permitted the Navy to continue its training without interruption.76 The 
majority of the Court agreed.77
With a tone clearly expressing a deep sense of urgency,78 Chief 
Justice Robert’s majority opinion completely bypasses the merits of the 
case, refusing to even address whether the Navy violated NEPA.79
According to the Chief Justice, two other very significant issues 
controlled the matter. First, the injunction prohibited the Navy from 
“conduct[ing] realistic training exercises to ensure that it is able to 
neutralize the threat posed by enemy submarines.”80 Second, the 
Executive, through statements made by the Navy, the CEQ, and the 
President himself, recognized that the forced interruption of these 
exercises created a national defense emergency.81 As it was thus parsed 
down, the majority recognized that the Navy’s interests in continuing its 
training clearly outweighed any environmental interests served by 
complying with NEPA.82 Therefore, since a court sitting in equity does 
not necessarily have to rule in favor of the party that would win on the 
merits,83 the Court found in favor of the Navy. In sum, because any 
injury caused by the Navy’s failure to comply with the statute “is 
outweighed by the public interest and the Navy’s interest in effective, 
realistic training of its sailors,” the Navy did not need to conform with
NEPA’s requirements.84
IV. IMPLICATIONS: WINTER’S EXPANDING EMERGENCY
Although Framers, such as Alexander Hamilton, viewed the 
emergency prerogative of the dictators of the Roman Republic with 
favor, it has always been evident that it was the abuse of those temporary 
and yet expansive emergency powers that led to the demise of the Roman 
Republic and the creation of the Roman Empire.85 Consequently, none of 
76. Id. at 10 (“[W]e had no duty to prepare an environmental impact statement because of the 
intervening event of the Council for Environmental Quality’s emergency circumstances alternative 
arrangements determination.”).
77. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 376. 
78. Chief Justice Robert’s opinion was heavily garnished with words such as “critical,” id. at 
370, “mission critical,” id. at 371, and “threat,” id. at 382, granting the whole of his opinion a sense 
of urgency as he addressed the facts of the case. 
79. Id. at 381 (“Given that the ultimate legal claim is that the Navy must prepare an EIS, not 
that it must cease sonar training, there is no basis for enjoining such training in a manner credibly 
alleged to pose a serious threat to national security.”).
80. Id. at 382. 
81. Id. at 373–74.
82. Id. at 382. 
83. Id. at 381.
84. Id. at 376. 
85. Joseph E. Olson & David B. Kopel, All the Way Down the Slippery Slope: Gun 
Prohibition in England and Some Lessons for Civil Liberties in America, 22 HAMLINE L. REV. 399,
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the Framers believed that the Constitution should ever grant the 
Executive absolute and unfettered authority.86 Unfortunately, the 
Supreme Court in Winter took a step in that direction when it erroneously 
stretched the normal boundaries of emergency executive powers. First, 
the Court expanded the legal definition of emergency in a manner that 
would allow the Executive to seek the protection of “self-made” 
emergencies. Second, it significantly lowered the bar for emergency 
powers by deferring to the judgment of the Executive for the 
determination of necessity. 
A.  Ransoming the Public for Power 
The circumstances necessitating the Navy training exercises at issue 
were not an emergency under either NEPA or the common law. In 1978, 
the CEQ, which has the authority to issue regulations interpreting 
NEPA,87 promulgated a regulation allowing the federal government to 
act “without observing the provisions of [the] regulation[]” when 
“emergency circumstances make it necessary.”88 This regulation would 
seem to be a codification of the implicit emergency powers of the 
Executive, as pertaining to NEPA. However, neither the regulation itself, 
nor any judicial interpretations of the statute have provided a definition 
for emergency circumstances. This requires an interpreter to look to the 
common law, as well as at general practice under the statute to discover 
its significance. 
Under the common law, an emergency is “an unforeseen 
combination of circumstances that calls for immediate action without 
time for full deliberation.”89 Using this definition, emergencies require 
both unpredictability and immediate action. Though the District Court’s 
injunction in Winter may have created a necessity that called for 
immediate action, the injunction was not an unforeseeable event. NEPA 
has been in effect since 1969, and “training exercises [] have been taking 
place in [Southern California] for the last 40 years.”90 Moreover, the 
Navy has “described the ability to operate MFA sonar,” a key component 
411 (1999) (stating that it was through a claim of temporary emergency powers that Julius Cæsar 
was able to become dictator for life). 
86. David Luban, On the Commander in Chief Power, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 477, 530 (2008) 
(“[N]one of the framers . . . advocated dictatorial powers for the executive, even in wartime.”).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (2006) (stating that the CEQ has authority “to formulate and 
recommend national policies to promote the improvement of the quality of the environment”).
88. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.11 (2009). 
89. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 523 (6th ed. 1990); 57 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal, etc., Tort 
Liability § 397 (2008) (“An emergency is a sudden or unexpected event or combination of 
circumstances calling for immediate action.”).
90. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 376 (2008). 
149] FORGET THE WHALES 161
of its training exercises, “as a “highly perishable skill” that must be 
repeatedly practiced under realistic conditions.”91 Under circumstances 
where the Navy should reasonably foresee its need to conduct future 
exercises and where the Navy has always had to comply with the statute 
in order to conduct those exercises, it is not reasonable to conclude that 
the Navy could not have foreseen the necessity of preparing an EIS. 
Additionally, general tort law requires governmental entities that 
seek the protection of emergency doctrines to not have created or 
contributed to the emergency in question.92 This is another instance 
where the Supreme Court has stretched the definition of emergency in 
order to accommodate the Executive. Because of the foreseeability of the 
need to file an EIS, the District Court’s emergency-creating injunction 
could have been avoided if the Navy had properly followed procedure 
from the beginning. It was only because of the Navy’s negligence or 
reckless disregard for the law, that the emergency was created.93
The Executive’s previous record in making alternative arrangements 
for NEPA compliance confirms the common law requirements of an 
emergency. Other occasions where alternative arrangements have been 
made include disasters such as: wildfires in San Diego, grasshopper 
infestations in Arizona, Hurricane Katrina relief, and even an impending 
war in the Persian Gulf.94 In the past, each time the Executive exercised 
its power to go beyond the boundaries of the statute, it was the result of 
an unforeseeable circumstance that required immediate action and was 
not the direct result of previous executive action. 
91. Id. at 377.
92. 57 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal, etc., Tort Liability § 397 (2008). This is immensely similar to 
the equitable “clean hands” doctrine. In cases of equity, such as this one, where a party seeks 
injunctive relief, it is necessary that the party approaching the court come with “clean hands.” 
Because the “clean hands” doctrine is such a fundamental concept of equity jurisprudence, Richards 
v. Tibaldi, 726 N.W.2d 770 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006), “he who has done iniquity cannot have equity,” 
Sorum v. Schwartz, 411 N.W.2d 652, 655 (N.D. 1987). Consequently, in many jurisdictions, failing 
to have clean hands results in a complete bar to claims in equity. E.g. Wilson v. Brown, 897 S.W.2d 
546, 549–50 (Ark. 1995). However, this doctrine, although comparable to this case in that it should 
not allow the Navy to claim the protection of an emergency doctrine, is not applicable in this 
situation. It was the Natural Resources Defense Council that petitioned the Northern District of 
California for equitable relief, and not the United States Navy. Therefore, the Navy is not asking for 
its own form of equitable relief, but a reversal of the lower courts’ decision to grant equitable relief 
to its adversary. 
93. The Ninth Circuit also caught on to this manufactured emergency, though only as a 
reason for why the Navy should not prevail on the merits. It did not, however, address the 
implications of the principle. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Winter, 518 F.3d 658, 681–82 (9th 
Cir. 2008). 
94. NEPA, Alternative Arrangements Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. Section 1506.11-Emergencies, 
http://www. nepa.gov/nepa/eis/alternative_arrangements_ Chart_092908.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 
2009). 
162 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 24
Under the circumstances, “if the Navy sought to avoid its NEPA 
obligations, its remedy [laid] in the Legislative Branch.”95 However, 
under this new definition of emergency powers handed down by the 
Court, the Executive no longer needs the Legislature. Hypothetically, the 
public safety, put in danger only through the Executive’s reckless 
disregard for the law, may be ransomed again with emergency power. 
B.  The Executive Will Necessarily Favor the Executive 
According to the Navy, the declaration that the Navy’s training 
exercises were “‘essential to national security’” and that the injunction 
would “‘create[] a significant and unreasonable risk’” to the American 
people,96 combined with CEQ’s alternative arrangements, “eliminated 
the injunction’s legal foundation.”97 Although the Supreme Court refused 
to specifically rule on whether the Executive’s actions actually relieved 
the Navy of its obligations,98 the Court used those very same statements 
from the Executive to vacate the lower court’s injunction and effectively 
rule that the circumstances did not require the Navy to comply with the 
Act.99
Admittedly, “neither the Members of [the Supreme] Court nor most 
federal judges,” nor the author of this Note for that matter, “begin the 
day with briefings that may describe new and serious threats to our 
Nation and its people.”100 Moreover, the Executive is probably the most 
qualified of all the branches of government to make determinations 
concerning emergencies and the imminence of dangerous attacks on the 
American people. 
However, deferring to the Executive by granting it unfettered review 
of its own policies completely abolishes the boundaries found in Justice 
Jackson’s nadir. Indeed, without independent review, “the false pretext 
of imminent danger” creates an additional zenith of executive power.101
Yet, unlike Jackson’s zenith,102 here the Executive reaches this summit of 
power independently. The resulting effects on the separation of powers 
are vast. In practice, an Executive could claim “emergency” or 
95. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 391 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting). 
96. Id. at 373. 
97. Id. at 388 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
98. Id. at 381 (stating that the Court was not addressing the merits of the plaintiff’s claims).
99. Id. at 376. 
100. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 2276–77 (2008). 
101. Saby Ghoshray, False Consciousness and Presidential War Power: Examining the 
Shadowy Bends of Constitutional Curvature, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 165, 184 (2009). 
102. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (stating that for the President to be at the zenith of his powers, he necessarily has to act 
with the approbation of the legislature). 
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“necessity” to justify any actions contrary to the law whenever it felt that 
such actions were prudent.103
Additionally, affording the Executive the prerogative to interpret the 
extent of its own emergency license will necessarily lower the threshold 
for a constitutionally permissible suspension of the normal balance of 
powers. When it comes to the use of executive-executed emergency 
powers, an Executive will be faced with two choices: First, it could 
refrain from exercising emergency powers at the risk of an emergency 
actually occurring, and then call upon those powers anyway in order to 
remedy the situation. Alternatively, the Executive might mitigate risks by 
exercising the power immediately at the expense of the constitutional 
balance of powers. Obviously, the latter choice leads to a propensity to 
call upon emergency powers even when necessity would not require 
them.104
Prior to Winter, the Supreme Court had already taken a position on 
this issue: “a state of war,” the most severe of emergencies, “is not a 
blank check for the President.”105 However, in “giv[ing] great deference 
to the professional judgment of military authorities concerning the 
relative importance of a particular military interest,”106 the Supreme 
Court disregards Youngstown’s boundaries of presidential power and 
103. Interestingly, this idea was proposed years before Winter went to the Supreme Court, and 
was often used to justify the abuses of the Bush Administration. See John C. Yoo, With “All 
Necessary and Appropriate Force,” L.A. TIMES, June 11, 2004, at B13 (“General criminal laws are 
usually not interpreted to apply to either [the President or the military], because otherwise they could 
interfere with the president’s constitutional responsibility to manage wartime operations.”).
104. A very similar dichotomy has been explored in free speech jurisprudence when 
considering principles of prior restraint. Scholars recognize that professional censors have a 
propensity toward adverse decision. For example, when a censor’s role is to examine material and 
determine that it is unobjectionable before it is released to the general public, that censor is 
encountered with two choices. First, the censor may be lenient toward the material, at the risk that it 
will actually be offensive to the public, causing general harm and putting that censor’s job at risk. 
Second, the censor may choose to take a more conservative approach by censoring anything that is 
remotely objectionable, protecting the public from any faint risk of harm preserving her own job. 
Obviously, the incentives lie in favor of increased censorship. See Thomas I. Emerson, The Doctrine 
of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 648, 657 (1955). In order to protect constitutional 
freedoms, the Supreme Court is very wary of state structures that have a propensity to create 
perverse incentives. See, e.g., Freedman v. State of Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965) (allowing 
government film censorship “only if it takes place under procedural safeguards designed to obviate 
the dangers of a censorship system”). It follows that in order to protect constitutional structures, such 
as the separation of powers, the Court should likewise be wary of broad doctrines that have that 
same tendency to lead to abuses of power. 
105. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube, 343
U.S. at 587). 
106. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 377 (2008) (citing Goldman v. 
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986)). Interestingly, the case that Justice Roberts cites to justify his 
position of deference to the executive branch [i.e. the military] involved the necessity of allowing the 
military the independence to create regulations for its own members and not to take actions outside 
of its own sphere contrary to enacted law. See Goldman, 475 U.S. at 507–08. Regrettably, citing that 
decision erroneously creates a false standard of deference to military operations, placing them 
beyond the reach of ordinary law. 
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cedes its important role of exercising judicial review to the Executive.107
This, essentially, grants the Executive carte blanche in determining 
when, and to what extent, he or she may rely on emergency 
circumstances to justify his or her actions. Such a ruling is a blank check 
for abuse. 
V. CONCLUSION
It may be tempting to brush Winter aside because the Supreme Court 
did not reach a decision on the merits due to the nature of the suit, but 
one should remember that fifty years ago, another case, more explicitly 
concerning the limits of presidential powers, sought after the same 
remedy.108 Both cases occurred during a period when the United States 
was at war.109 In each case, the Executive’s actions were directly 
contrary to congressional will.110 Most importantly, in both situations, 
because of emergency circumstances, the Executive Branch justified its 
actions as necessary in defense of the public good.111
Nevertheless, in Winter, the Supreme Court departs from the 
standard set half a century ago in Youngstown. By finding in favor of the 
Navy, the Court altered the accepted Jackson taxonomy by expanding its 
zone of twilight, and diminishing its nadir. Winter accomplished this by 
first revising the definition of an emergency—eliminating its requirement 
of unforeseeability and permitting an Executive to seek the protection of 
emergency powers for manufactured emergencies caused by the reckless 
disregard of the law or negligence of that Executive. Second, the Winter
decision allows the Executive to “be the judge in [its] own case,”112
107. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
108. Compare Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 372 (stating that the respondents had sought an injunction 
against the Navy), with Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 584–85 (1952) (stating that the steel companies 
sought an injunction against the Secretary of Commerce restraining the enforcement of President 
Truman’s order).
109. Compare Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 376–77 (referring to the hostile circumstances abroad to 
justify the denial of the respondent’s injunction), with Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 590–91 (appendix) 
(referring to the Korean Conflict as a necessary reason for permitting the President to seize the steel 
factories). 
110. Compare Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 390 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that the Navy’s 
publication of its EIS, scheduled after the completion of its exercises, defeats the purpose of NEPA), 
with Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 586 (stating that five years prior to the President Truman’s executive 
order, Congress had already rejected granting a government authorization for the seizure of private 
property in the event of an emergency). 
111. Compare Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 373 (stating that the President considered the Naval 
exercises to be “essential to national security”), with Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 583 (stating that 
President Truman believed that the continued availability of steel was of capital importance to the 
security of the United States). 
112. According to the old maxims of law, making an individual a judge in his own case was a 
direct violation of due process, or the law of the land. Essentially, it meant that a judge was not 
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deferring to [it] for a determination of when emergency circumstances 
are present, creating an incentive for Executives to call upon those 
powers more often and under circumstances that are less than public 
emergencies. 
During their confirmation hearings, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Alito firmly declared their concurrence with Justice Jackson’s 
Youngstown opinion. Ironically, two years later, they were possibly 
accomplice to one of the most significant expansions of executive power 
to date. 
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